Op-30C/gm



INT 774/



NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

16 April 1948

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN AUSTIN.

Subject:

ودسري سيايين

Organizational Position of the Proposed NSIA.

Reference:

(a) SANACC 304 series.

1. The best organizational position for NSIA is one of the most complicated questions I have ever considered. The following tabulation lists apparent advantages and disadvantages of the positions that have occurred to me:

(a) Establish NSIA under the CIA.

Advantages

(1) Maximum obtainable security


- (2) Fully authoritative control by Director CIA.
- (3) Derive guidance from broad policy emanating from NSC.
- (4) Requires shift of organizational position only to direct control of NSC in time of war - very little change.

Disadvantages

- (1) Some policy question would still come up to NSC. (This may be a disadvantage from NSC point of view be importance of NSIA a tepid or a real wais so great that NSC should always advisor President regarding it, no matter what its organizational position.)
- (2) Would probably require the an amendment to, or an extremely liberal interpretation of the National Security Act.
- (3) STATE participation would be only by liaison; this is truto a less important degree for Treasury Commerce, etc.

Exite National Security Council under provisions of EC 12065

. 1 -





Op-30C/gm

SECRET Subject: _

ŧ

1

Organizational Position of the Proposed NSIA

(b) Establish NSIA under N.M.E. (Sec. Def.).

Advantages

- (1) Security almost as good as under CIA.
- (2) Fully authoritative control by Sec. Def.
- (3) No legislation required.

Disadvantages

- (1) STATE participation would be only by lisi son; this is true to . less important degree for Treasury, Commerci etc.
- (2) Too military a flavor for the public taste.
- (3) Domestic nature of a large portion of war output will require shift upon outbreak of hostilities.
- (c) Establish NSIA directly under the President.

Advantages

Reduce NSC work load to purely advisory role

Disadvantages

- (1) Establishes a "free wheeling" recur without brakes or control except the little that an overworked Presider can give it.
- (2) Is not geared for exact ive implementation threthe theater commanders in time of war.
- (3) Certain to be a target for attacks by the minority party, the Fourth Estate, educators, and liberals.
- (d) Establish NSIA under a civilian organization.

An influential member of Congress has discussed the desirability and fessibility of utilizing an entity like the Carnegie or Rockefeller Foundations as "cover" for the NSIA.

> ţ ...

- 2 -



1NT 774/3



Subject:

Days .

Organizational Position of the Proposed NSIA

Advantages

Probably less public antipathy than to any other arrangement.

- Disadvantages
- (1) Minimum of security. Could conceivably be penetrated by Reds to a marked degree.
- (2) Sustaining appropriations would present a recurrent legal legfslative problem.
- (3) Not effective in time of war nor fully effective in peacetime.
- (e) Establish NSIA under policy direction of NSC.

Advantages

<u>Disadvantages</u>

- (1) As an important entity (1) Adds to work load of of the "Organization NSC. for National Security", NSIA would be in a position to receive proper broad policy guidance from NSC and best lisison from State and N.M.E.
- (2) Requires no shift of organizational position on outbreak of hostilities.
- (3) Would receive little public disfavor perhaps general approbation that an effective step had been taken.
- (4) Very necessary coordination with political, economic, and military interests could be assured. (German failure to effect this on the Goebbels-Himaler level may well have cost them Ukrainian support and perhaps continental European hegemony.)
- (f) Establish NSIA under STATE.

- 3 -





Op-30C/gm

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 774/4

SECRET

(Andring

Subject:

Organizational Position of the Proposed NSIA.

Advantages

Disadvantages

- (1) Fair coordination with NME. Other executive departments.
- (1) Only fair security
- (2) Would perhaps take advantage of OTR Lessons learned.
- (2) Too "lily-fingered" treatment.

(3) Should be shifted upor

outbreak of hostilitie

ons learned.

g) Establish NSIA under SANACC.

Advantages

Disadvantages

- (1) Good coordination with NME and State.
- (1) SANACC is not a legal! established body.
- (2) Would perhaps take advantage of OIE lessons learned.
- (3) Decreases work load of NSC.

of NSC.

2. Most of the above possible positions have been discussed by SSE and by the three P.W. sections of the N.M.R. It must be assumed that their various advantages and disadvantages were considered by the JCS in making their recommendation (Encl. to SANACC 304/14) to put NSIA under the NSC. My recommendation is:

Lst Choice: Establish NSIA under the policy direction of NSC.
Procure a Director of the high calibre required to
run the NSIA with infrequent reference to NSC.
(JCS recommendation should be given great weight.)

2nd Choice: Establish NSIA under SANACC.

3. Under no circumstances should SSE be abolished or its planning functions curtailed, but the crying need for an energetic, intelligent, progressive Chairman grows more apparent every day.

Respectfully,

Robt. L. Campbell

- 4 -



12

CHRONOLOGY OF SANACC 304 SERIES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE,
AND RELAYED NSC STUDIES

June 13, 1946 - SNNCC designated an ad hoc committee:

"to review World War II efforts in psychological warfare, to study and report on the future status of psychological warfare, and recommend:

- a peace-time organization for keeping psychological warfare in a ready-formobilization status;
- b. a war-time psychological organization;
- c. both organization to be assigned such directives as will insure effective planning, coordinating, and implementation, particularly with respect to the integration of national psychological warfare with military plans."

SNNCC 304/1 and /2 - Charter and Terms of Reference of the Special committee on Psychological Warfare prepared by an ad hoc committee.

SNNCC 304/3,4,5 Questions of how much psychological warfare and 7, 27 Oct. - information can be given to Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress and to a member of Congress who is preparing to introduce legislation on this subject.

SNNCC 304/6
30 Sept. 1047 - Report by the Subcommittee on Special Studies and
Evaluation which supplements the report by the ad hoc committee
in 304/1 and /2. Following is a brief of this report:

Basic requirements to activate a national organization for psychological warfare and relationships on upper levels are discussed.

Assumes that active military aggression will begin without warning and mobilization will necessarily be conducted in a few hours, or at most a few months.

A <u>Psychological Warfare Organization</u> should be established "in time of war (or threat of war...)" under the NSC or SANACC, headed by a director (either a civilian or Commissioned Officer) who reports directly to NSC and the President or to SANACC.

The director shall coordinate national psychological warfare activities of established

į÷

n ma

UNCLASSIFIED

...

A 150 CO

INT774/6

agencies and serve as chairman of a planning board composed of representatives of JCS, Dept. of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA, with other agency representation as appropriate.

Authority should be derived from an Executive Order or specific legislation.

Organization should:

- a. Plan, develop, control and coordinate all foreign and domestic psychological warfare activities.
- b. Formulate and execute through radio, press, and motion pictures, information programs on status of war effort of U.S. and coordinate war informational activities of all federal departments and agencies.
- A "psychological warfare specialist" category of positions should be established and training programs instituted in Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force to provide adequately trained personnel. Rosters should be established to include the students of the training programs, personnel currently available in the Dept. of State, and personnel who were in psychological warfare activities in the Army, Navy, Air Force, OSI and OSS in World War II.

The Subcommittee requests a decision from SANACC as to whether NSC or SANACC should be the accountable agency, and recommends that after approval of the report it be sent to the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence for "guidance and appropriate action."

Additional studies being made by the Subcommittee are on:


- 1. The plans for employment of psychological warfare.
- "Black" propaganda in relation to "White" propaganda and in relation to sabotage, conspiracy and subversion.

11:

198

3. Problems of integrating civilian and military personnel into the organization.

- 2 -





IN1774/7

4. Management of information and propaganda when zone of combat is within Continental U.S.

SANACC 304/8
20 Oct. 1947 - Memorandum by the Army Member of SANACC on 304/8.
Following is a brief of this memorandum:

The Army Member considers it premature and unnacessary at this time to determine the agency which should conduct psychological warfare. He feels the timely question is "Should the US at the present time utilize coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of its national objectives?" If so, what organization is required and what should be its terms of reference?" The organization proposed in SNNCC 304/6 is for time of war or in threat of war.

61st MEETING OF SANACC

. (September 16.)

23 Oct. 1047 - Designated an ad hoc committee to study and report on the question raised in SANACC 304/8 by the Army Member - "Should the US at the present time utilize coordinated psychological measures in furtherance of the attainment of its national objectives? If so, what organization is required and what should be its terms of reference?" Referred SANACC 304/6 back to the Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation for revision in light of discussion.

SANA 5781

24 Oct. 1947 - Memo to ad hoc committee members instructing them to study and report on the above question.

SANACC 304/9/D

27 Oct. 1947

- Directs Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation to revise SANACC 304/6 in light of discussion at the 61st Meeting.

SANACC 304/10

3 Nov. 1947 - Report by the <u>ad hoc</u> committee designated to study and report on the question raised in SANACC 304/6. A brief of this report follows:


The committee concluded that the present world situation requires the U.S. immediately to develop and utilize strong and concerted measures designed to produce psychological situations and effects favorable to the attainment of U.S. national objectives. Initial measures should be to provide closer coordination of policies and more effective integration and intensification of operations in the field of informational activities. To accomplish this the committee recommends

31.77

- 3 -



British St.



establishment of a high-level inter-departmental board responsible for the formulation of policies and broad plans pertaining to informational activities and to certain related psychological activities.

Initial membership:
Representative of the Secretary of State
(Asst. level) Chairman
Representative of the Secretary of the Ammy,
Navy, Air Force (Asst. level).
Representative of CIA

Board empowered to provide for participation of other departments and agencies.

The committee split on question of agency under which Board should be established -- NSC or the Committee of Two.

Full-time working Group, under a Director, with separate funds and necessary legislation.

62nd Meeting of
SANACC

19 Nov. 1047 - Returned SANACC 304/10 to the ad hoc
committee to revise in light of the discussions in both the SANACC and
War Council Meetings. (It was brought out in the SANACC Meeting that
this matter had already been discussed in the War Council and a summary
of that discussion should be made available to the subcommittee).

SANACC 304/11
7 Nov. 1947
Amended 13
Nov. 1947

Revision of SANACC 304/10 by ad hoc committee
In this report the committee concluded that the present world situation
requires the US immediately to develop and utilize coordinated measures
designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction
favorable to the attainment of US objectives and to counteract effects
of anti-American propaganda.

The Secretary of State should be charges with the responsibility for the general direction and coordination of these measures, and it is assumed that such responsibility will be delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. He would be assisted initial by an informal group of representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, and CIA; subsequently by other departments and agencie at his discretion. A Director, appointed by the Assistant Secretary would head a working group furnished by the participating departments and agencies.

SANACC approved 304/11 and referred it to the NSC for appropriate action.

-4-

įŀ

1

1. 141

INCLASSIFIED

INT.774/9

NSC 2d Meeting
14 Nov. 1947 - Referred SANACC 304/11 to the NSC Staff for revision in light of the discussion at the NSC Meeting.

NSC 4 Series

9 Dec. 1947 - In its consideration of SANACC 304/11, the NSC Staff felt that the two related but separate purposes which were intended to be accomplished by the report should be presented to the NSC separately. These reports were approved by NSC and implemented as directed.

SANACC approved in principle SANACC 304/6, except the question of whether the Psychological Warfare Organization should be established under NSC or SANACC and transmitted the report to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, the JCS, and CIA for "guidance and appropriate action"

SANA 5886 9 Jan. 1948

Memo to JCS requesting comments on SNNCC 304/6.

SANACC 304/12
23 March 1948 - A report by Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations on its own initiative, to provide a plan for a National Wartime Psychological Warfare Organization which may be used as a basis for further planning. Although in approving SANACC 304/6, SANACC held in abeyance the decision to establish a national psychological warfare organization under the NSC, in view of the authoritative control and coordination such as organization will require, the SANACC Subcommittee assumed the NSC will eventually supervise such an organization. The basic plan for this organization is appended to the report. This report has been approved by SANACC as a possible basis for further planning and was referred to NSC for information.

SANACC 304/13 26 March 1948

Memorandum by Air Force Member approving SANACC 304/12 subject to amendments:

a. Statement of the problem to read: "To provide an outline plan for a National Security Information Agency. (National Psychological Warfare Organization) to function in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President)."

h. Change final Conclusion to forward approved report to NSC for consideration and appropriate action, rather than to forward approved report to the NSC, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the JCS, and the CIA for information and appropriate action within the respective depart ments and agencies. (Note: Only the latter amendment was adopted).

: ;

- 5 -





(INT 774/10

He requested urgent special consideration of SANACC 304/12.

SANACC 304/14

8 April 1948 - Views of the JCS on SENCC 304/6. Although on April 7, 1948, SANACC approved the changes to SNNCC 304/6 recommended by the JCS, no revision has yet been made and the JCS recommendations (SANACC 304/14) have been forwarded to the NSC (Appendix to SANACC 304/14, the JCS views were to be "forwarded for consideration by the NSC before action is taken by the SANACC to amend SNNCC 304/6". However, at its 64th Meeting on April 7, 1948, SANACC revised the memorandum to read "Forwarded for the consideration of the NSC are the views of the JCS on SENCC which are concurred in by the SANACC". In this connection, the plan for a National Wartime Psychological Warfare Organization (SANACC 304/12), approved by SANACC as a basis for further planning, has been forwarded to the NSC for information.

485,000

- 6 -

UNCLASSIFIED